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Abstract
Spontaneous interaction in wireless ad-hoc networks is often desirable not only be-
tween users or devices in direct contact, but also with devices that are accessible only via
a wireless network. Secure communication with such devices is difficult because of the
required authentication, which is often either password- or certificate-based. An intu-
itive alternative is context-based authentication, where device authenticity is verified by
shared context, and often by direct physical evidence. Devices that are physically sepa-
rated cannot experience the same context and thus cannot benefit directly from context
authentication. We introduce a context authentication proxy that is pre-authenticated
with one of the devices and can authenticate with the other by shared context. This
concept is applicable to a wide range of application scenarios, context sensing technolo-
gies, and trust models. We show its practicality in an implementation for setting up
IPSec connections based on spatial reference. Our specific scenario is ad-hoc access of
mobile devices to secure 802.11 WLANs using a mobile device as authentication proxy. A
user study shows that our method and implementation are intuitive to use and compare
favourably to a standard, password-based approach.
1 Introduction
Spontaneous interaction is a desirable feature for many ubiquitous computing scenarios.
It is typically seen as a process between users or devices that are in direct contact with
each other, and often implies spatial proximity. However, spontaneous interaction can
also be important between users or devices that are physically or virtually separated, but
can communicate over some common channel like a wireless network. A similar situation
∗This is an extended version of “Rene Mayrhofer: A Context Authentication Proxy for IPSec using Spatial
Reference, Proc. TwUC 2006, Austrian Computer Society (OCG), 449–462, December 2006”.
arises when interacting with devices that do not feature any user interface, but only
communicate wirelessly. One prominent example is IEEE 802.11 WLAN itself: users,
represented by their client devices, engage in spontaneous interaction with access points
that usually neither have a user interface nor are physically accessible (they might be
built into building infrastructure).
The problem with such settings is to authenticate users or devices. Wireless net-
works are particularly vulnerable to attacks, ranging from simple eavesdropping to more
sophisticated man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. Although there are well-known pro-
tocols to secure communication over wireless networks, they all depend on some form
of authentication. Only after authenticating the communication partner, further steps
to create a secure channel make sense. More specifically, the problem is to authenticate
intuitively and efficiently.
From a user point of view, secure channel setup should be as transparent as possi-
ble and should cause minimal, if any, overhead to the desired spontaneous interaction.
Any additional burden that is caused by authentication is not part of the intended in-
teraction, and thus collides with spontaneity. Obvious and often deployed solutions for
authentication are typically either secure or convenient. Password-based authentication
like Bluetooth-style PINs, WEP, and WPA-PSK is one example, which is unfortunately
neither particularly secure nor user friendly; another well-known solution is certificate-
based authentication like X.509 public key infrastructures (PKIs).
An example of a secure channel implementation is IPSec. It is currently considered
one of the most secure communication protocols, supports both password- and certificate-
based authentication, and has been designed for cross-platform interoperability, but is
daunting to set up even for technically skilled users. Although it has desirable properties
from a security point of view, many users may choose not to use it for spontaneous
and ad-hoc interactions. Giving credit to its wide-spread use and practical problems,
also investigated by others [1, 3], we therefore use the setup of IPSec connections as our
motivating example. More specifically, our demonstration application is to grant secure
access to a WLAN access point – and consequently the network it manages – to new
clients such as laptops via IPSec connections.
Context based authentication, or context authentication, allows secure and intuitive
authentication without introducing unreasonable overhead that would be incompatible
with spontaneous interaction. It uses shared context between devices to create shared
secrets. These shared secrets can consequently be used as cryptographic tokens for cre-
ating secure channels. However, devices such as WLAN access points that are physically
separated from user devices or that have no sensors or user interfaces are unable to
experience the same context.
Our approach to allow such devices to authenticate via shared context is to introduce
a context authentication proxy. The proxy is pre-authenticated to the device that does
not have sensors or a user interface itself, and authenticates to other devices on behalf of
it. This concept is independent of the underlying infrastructure for expressing trust, and
can work in online and offline settings and with existing password- or certificate-based au-
thentication mechanisms. Our example application uses a mobile context authentication
proxy in the form of a personal digital assistant (PDA) for better ease of use.
The contribution of this work is twofold: we examine the general concept of a context
authentication proxy in more detail, discuss different options of implementing it, and we
show a specific application for a widely used protocol. A user study shows that authenti-
cation based on relative location — one aspect of shared context — is a viable alternative
to standard, password-based authentication. Our implementation also confirms a user
study presented in related work [1], anecdotally showing a significant improvement of
ease of use in setting up IPSec connections due to use of context authentication. We
also argue that, although demonstrated by an application for securing wireless networks,
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context authentication proxies are of wider applicability.
In the following, we first discuss related work in Section 2 and the previously in-
troduced concept of context authentication in Section 3. Our main contribution is the
general notion of an authentication proxy presented in Section 4 and our specific imple-
mentation for authenticating IPSec connections shown in Section 5 which we investigate
in Section 6. Finally, we discuss further alternatives for implementing context authenti-
cation and for using the established shared secrets in secure communication protocols in
Section 7.
2 Related work
Our chosen example of securing IEEE 802.11 WLAN using context authentication has
also been discussed by Balfanz et al. [1]. They present a system called “Network-in-a-
box” (NiaB) that uses an infrared channel to transmit authentic cryptographic tokens
and automates the set-up of secure wireless communication in much the same way as our
example application does. This infrared connection is established between the client de-
vice and either the WLAN access point itself, or, in case of a distributed infrastructure,
an “enrollment station”, which can be regarded as a stationary instance of a context
authentication proxy. Furthermore, they show in a user study that context authentica-
tion can, for end-users, significantly lower the time required to set up a secure wireless
network. The major difference to our work is the role of the authentication proxy. In
NiaB, the authentication proxy is described as a permanent station that authenticates
all devices that are able to establish infrared connections to it. On the other hand, we
specifically assign the authentication proxy an active role, in which it triggers the authen-
tication process to a selected client, as described in more detail in Section 4. A specific
advantage of our approach is that the authentication proxy can be mobile — and for our
demonstration application, it explicitly is. Instead of forcing users to bring their devices
to fixed stations, administrators can authenticate devices wherever it is necessary and
appropriate. This can include authentication of new fixed stations, which is not possible
with the less flexible enrollment station described by NiaB.
Kindberg et.al. [8] describe “channel proxies”, which may be seen as a low-level imple-
mentation of a context authentication proxy. These channel proxies selectively forward
messages depending on some constraints, like location of the sender or the receiver. In
contrast, our concept of context authentication proxies explicitly includes high-level pro-
cessing of messages. In our example, this allows the complete authentication protocol to
be performed between the proxy and the WLAN client, while the WLAN access point
will typically be unaware of the whole process.
Godber and Dasgupta [3] describe another implementation that is closely related
to the demonstrative application we discuss in Section 5. Their system called “Secure
Wireless Gateway” (SWG) uses IPSec to secure IEEE 802.11b WLAN, and also provides
a captive portal to redirect unauthenticated users to a web page with instructions on how
to authenticate. They suggest to use a common shared key for guest users, which is to
be considered insecure against MITM attacks, and individual shared keys for registered
users. However, they explicitly do not investigate generation and distribution of these
individual shared keys or the use of certificate-based authentication and define it as out
of scope of their work. In the present article, we focus on this key distribution problem
and present an implementation similar to SWG as an example application making use
of easy key distribution.
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(a) USB dongles for sensing relative spatial positions can be added
to typical off-the-shelf laptops, PDAs, or even mobile phones
(b) User interface for spatial selection
Figure 1: Current implementation of context authentication by spatial reference
3 Context authentication
Context authentication tries to provide intuitive means of authenticating users or devices
by verifying that they are in some specific context, e.g. at some specific location. The
possibilities for sharing context are obviously constrained by the sensors available to
the involved devices. These sensors are used to verify some properties of the device
to authenticate, i.e. to verify that the other device is in the same context. Context
authentication then aims to create shared secrets for setting up secure communication,
usually in the form of cryptographic key material.
In earlier work we reported on using spatial reference for authenticating spontaneous
interaction [13] and on the security properties of our underlying localization method [12].
Selecting devices based on direct line of sight has also been explored with the “ges-
turePen” [18]. The gesturePen has the intention of selecting devices by pointing at
them, in much the same way as we select devices based on their relative spatial position
in this work. Location is just one option for context authentication, and for the descrip-
tion of additional options, we refer to others [8, 2]. In the present article, we investigate
connections that are initiated in an ad-hoc manner but that might yield longer-lived
security associations. Specifically, we establish IPSec connections on first contact, but
continue to use these connections once established.
Building upon our current implementation [13], we assume devices to be equipped
with sensors in the form of USB dongles. These dongles provide accurate sensing of
relative spatial positions using ultrasound. Figure 1a shows two of them attached to a
laptop and attached to a PDA — both can sense each others position with an accuracy
of better than 10 centimeters in distance and 25◦ in angle [6].
In an office space with many laptops, PDAs, and other devices communicating over
the same wireless network within a small area, this fine-grained sensing of shared context
offers distinct advantages in selecting specific devices. If an administrator wants to allow
“that device over there” to access the wireless network†, then other devices in the same
room should not automatically be allowed too. Solutions based on infrared connections
can not easily provide such a fine-grained selection because infrared beams often span
the whole area.
Our context authentication protocol integrates secure authentication transparently
†The same method can be used to allow access to private parts of the network, or, more generally speaking,
to specific resources. We use access to the wireless network only as an example.
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Figure 2: Using a context authentication proxy P allows physically separated devices A and
B to benefit from context authentication even when they can not experience the same context
and seamlessly with device selection, as shown in Figure 1b. Simply by selecting a vi-
sualized device position, corresponding to the physical device as visible to the user, the
authentication process is triggered. User interaction is thus changed from selecting de-
vices from a network-discovered list to a spatially-discovered environment; authenticating
selected devices happens automatically without further user interaction. This seamless
integration makes the protocol well suited for spontaneous interaction. Security prop-
erties of our authentication protocol [13] and ultrasound as an out-of-band channel [12]
have been discussed previously. Here we simply assume the protocol to provide a shared
secret to both devices that perform the spatial authentication.
Although we build upon this specific authentication protocol for our demonstrative
application, the concept of authentication proxies is independent of the underlying sens-
ing platform for context authentication.
4 Authentication proxy
Previous work on context authentication assumes that those devices that authenticate
each other can experience the same context, but this is not always possible. Figure 2
shows a device A, e.g. owned by Alice, trying to interact securely with a device B, e.g.
a WLAN access point. Because the access point is physically inaccessible, Alice can
not benefit from direct context authentication with it to secure her communication. By
introducing a context authentication proxy P, we give her this option. The authentication
proxy experiences the same context as one of the devices, i.e. it shares some aspect of
the context. With the other device, it is pre-authenticated. It will usually be desirable
that context be shared with the more volatile side, i.e. with mobile devices, changing
environments, or, generally speaking, with transient connections. Since we assume a
more permanent relationship with the other end of the authentication, in this example
between P and the access point, the necessary pre-authentication only needs to occur
once during set-up of these devices. Any standard authentication protocol, e.g. password-
or certificate-based ones or any means of conveying trust of B in P can be used. Due
to this trust relationship, the possibly mobile authentication proxy P is assumed to be
used or maintained by a trusted person, such as a system administrator.
The main task of the authentication proxy is to create a shared secret between A and
B, to enable secure communication between them over a wireless network. Depending on
the initiator of the authentication, we can distinguish between two different approaches
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for user interaction with the proxy:
• We speak of a passive authentication proxy when P acts as an authentication service
and simply waits for clients to initiate an interaction. The client takes the active
role, starts context authentication with P to obtain a shared secret for communicat-
ing securely with B, and may need to engage in another authentication procedure
with B over the now-authenticated wireless network. Instances of this approach are
the closely related NiaB [1], and one of our previous works [14], which describes
the use of RFID tags to secure communication over wireless ad-hoc peer-to-peer
networks. The former requires a further offline authentication step performed by
the in-house certificate authority when used for “enterprise” WLAN access, or re-
lies on the infrared channel authentication for the simpler “home” WLAN setting.
In the latter, we store public keys of network peers on associated RFID tags that
can be read for secure spontaneous interaction. Note that in this previous work,
we termed the RFID tags “objects” and the associated devices with which the
interaction takes place the “proxies” because of a slightly different focus on the
interaction.
• For an active authentication proxy, the roles of waiting for and of initiating the
context authentication are swapped between A and P. That is, the proxy takes the
active role, starts context authentication with A to generate a shared secret for
letting A communicate securely with B, and may take additional steps to register
A with authorization databases. In this case, A only waits to be authenticated and
does not need to take any additional steps. This requires even less user interaction
by offloading some steps to the proxy and can thus further decrease the burden
placed on the user for setting up secure communication. We point out that the in-
teraction between A and P, and subsequently between A and B, is still spontaneous.
However, the change in roles relieves the client from going through additional steps
after the initial context authentication and shifts this task to the proxy. P is in a
better position to perform them, because it is part of the existing network and is
thus assumed to know more about it than the new client.
Choosing between a passive and an active authentication proxy also depends on the
respective trust model. If the trust model can express transitive trust, i.e. delegating trust
from one entity to another, then B can delegate authorization decisions to P. Without
the ability to delegate trust, an active authentication proxy can still initiate the context
authentication, but a subsequent authorization step might be necessary before A can
access resources on B. In this case, the choice of authentication proxy should match
the interaction style of the application, i.e. who initiates the spontaneous interaction.
Note that arbitrary trust models can be used, including the sharing of passwords —
which is clearly not recommended from a security point of view — and that most can
be used to delegate trust in some way. A concept for delegating restricted trust over
potentially multiple hops is described e.g. by Steffen and Knorr [17] and could be used
in combination with context authentication proxies.
One secure and standardized option to delegate trust is to use X.509 certificates
signed by a certificate authority (CA) managed by P and trusted by B. Every certificate
that P creates and signs will be trusted by B, allowing P to make decisions about autho-
rizing clients to use B’s services. In this sense, our approach of a context authentication
proxy is an implementation of the plug-and-play PKI [5]: a client device is automatically
provided with an X.509 certificate that allows it to use some services. But instead of
initially authenticating with the suggested username/password combination, we authen-
ticate client devices based on context, specifically based on their relative spatial position.
This makes the approach more usable for spontaneous interaction.
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(a) The proxy implements the CA — no connec-
tion between the proxy and the access point is
necessary
(b) The access point (or infrastructure) implements the CA
— the proxy needs an online connection to request certifi-
cates for and forward them to the client
Figure 3: Two options for delegating trust with a context authentication proxy
5 Application for establishing IPSec connections
In this section we present IPSecME (IPSec made easy), an application to delegate trust
for authorizing IPSec connections that uses an active authentication proxy and standard
X.509 certificates. It uses our secure spatial authentication protocol described in earlier
work [13] and does not depend on software being pre-installed on the client like NiaB.
5.1 Concept
Our IPSecME application can be used for setting up arbitrary IPSec connections by
providing appropriate connection details in the form of an XML configuration file to the
authentication proxy. IPSec tunnels over an otherwise open 802.11 WLAN are a practical
example without loss of generality. For simplifying the discussion, we also assume the
access point to act as an IPSec gateway, but it could be easily split into different devices
without any change to our work.
IPSecME consists of two parts, one running on the client and one on the proxy
device. Figure 3 shows two options for implementing this application using an active
context authentication proxy P: the CA can either run directly on P, or it can run on
the access point B (or any other infrastructure device). In the former case, B delegates
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trust about authorization to P by allowing all clients A that present a certificate signed
by the proxy’s CA to establish IPSec tunnels. As illustrated in Fig. 3a:
1. P authenticates A via shared context, in this application via spatial reference.
2. A can optionally send information about the logged in user, the machine name,
etc., if this should be encoded in the X.509 certificate.
3. P generates a new X.509 certificate with the information provided by A and/or
locally entered data and signs it with its CA key. Note that the certificate is
bundled with the matching private key.
4. P forwards the new certificate, the private key, its CA certificate, and details about
the IPSec connection, i.e. the IP address of the gateway, the remote subnet, etc. to
A. The private key is encrypted with the shared key generated in step 1.
5. A uses its new certificate and the IPSec connection description to establish a secure
connection to B.
This option has the advantage that no online connection between the P and B is required.
The trust between them is formed by B importing P’s CA certificate. After this, no
further communication between B and P is necessary for authenticating arbitrary clients‡.
In the latter case, P requests certificates from the CA running on B using an
online connection. As illustrated in Fig. 3b:
1. equal to step 1 in the former case
2. equal to step 2 in the former case
3. P generates a certificate request with the information provided by A and/or locally
entered data and sends it to B.
4. B decides if A should be authorized and, if yes, signs the certificate request with
its CA key and adds the new certificate to its authorization database.
5. B sends the new certificate to P.
6. equal to step 4 in the former case
7. equal to step 5 in the former case
The necessarily secure connection between B and P forms the pre-authentication
between them with a slightly different trust model. B trusts P to authenticate A
based on shared context and to forward machine information and certificates, but
keeps decisions about authorization local. For spontaneous interaction, the first
option has the advantage that no online connection between B and P is necessary,
and we therefore implement this one.
5.2 Implementation
The implementation currently runs on a standard Laptop running Windows XP
SP2 or Linux with any of the available IPSec implementations as the client A and
a PDA running Pocket PC 2003 (or a laptop running any supported operating sys-
tem) as the authentication proxy P. Because our context authentication protocol
using spatial reference and the IPSecME application have been implemented in
Java, other platforms can be supported fairly easily. All platform-specific parts,
‡Note that revoking a certificate that P generated will require an update of its associated certificate
revocation list (CRL) on B, and consequently communication between B and P. However, for spontaneous
interactions, short-lived certificates can be used to alleviate the need for CRL updates.
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i.e. managing certificates, establishing IPSec connections, and access to the ul-
trasound sensing devices, have been implemented for Windows XP, Linux, and
Mac OS/X. The combination of access point and IPSec gateway, depicted as B in
the above concept, has been implemented in two different versions. A standard
access point connected to a PC running Gibraltar firewall [11] represents an en-
terprise scenario where the functionality of B is distributed in the infrastructure.
An embedded implementation using the OpenWrt distribution [16] on an Asus
WL-500GP access point represents the home/small office scenario with a single,
combined device. Both implementations use Openswan [19] as IPSec implemen-
tation and ChilliSpot [7] to provide the captive portal. These two scenarios show
that our approach can be used with arbitrary implementations of WLANs and
IPSec gateways as long as they support external X.509 CAs.
Figure 4 shows how users experience the whole process. The client does not
need to have any special software pre-installed and does not need any a priori
information about the environment. When it first connects to the WLAN, which
is publicly accessible, its web browser gets redirected to a local web page in the
same way as it is used by the currently popular WLAN hot spots (see Fig. 4a).
From this web page, the user can start the client part of the application via Java
Webstart and then simply waits for the proxy to initiate authentication. We as-
sume that devices are either equipped with ultrasound sensing or that the USB
dongles are attached at this stage. For ease of use, we skip the optional step 2
and omit to use client-provided information for generating the certificate. With
spontaneous interaction, any such information tends to be meaningless anyway
due to the lack of a globally accepted naming scheme. An administrator using the
context authentication proxy can then select the client based on spatial reference
(see Fig. 4b) and specify the validity period of the certificate and optionally a
name describing the client for later use (see Fig. 4c). This name only needs to be
meaningful within this environment, e.g. to the administrator. After initiating the
context authentication protocol, the certificate is generated and signed automat-
ically, and the IPSec connection details along with the certificate are sent to the
client (see Fig. 4d). Note that the private key contained in the PKCS#12 format
used for transmitting the certificate is encrypted with the shared secret that has
been established between the client and the proxy during context authentication.
Thus, they can communicate over the public, insecure WLAN without worry-
ing about attacks. Finally, after receiving the certificate and connection details,
the client can, when accepting them, immediately import its new certificate and
establish the IPSec connection (see Fig. 4e and 4f). Further communication is
automatically secured by the IPSec tunnel, which in our case includes all traffic
to and from the client.
6 Experimental Evaluation
Although our spatial authentication method in general and our authentication
proxy application for establishing IPSec connections in particular have been de-
signed to make user interaction as intuitive as possible, they are new and to this
time unknown to potential users. In contrast, users have already been trained
to use existing, typically password-based methods to get access to WLANs. We
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(a) Client: When first trying to access the net-
work, the client is redirected to a page that deliv-
ers the client application
(b) Authentication proxy: selecting the
client to authenticate based on spatial refer-
ence
(c) Authentication proxy: af-
ter setting a name and the valid-
ity period for the new certificate,
the client is authenticated
(d) Client: authentication in
progress
(e) Client: accepting the new cer-
tificate and the CA of the IPSec
gateway to establish the connec-
tion
(f) Client: IPSec connection
successfully established
Figure 4: Screen shots of the IPSecME application10
(a) Method 1: authentication with standard net-
work accounts
(b) Method 2: authentication with IPSecME
Figure 5: Screen shots of respective captive web pages
therefore conducted two user studies to evaluate how end-users react to our method
and to discover potential issues, and one informal study from the administrator
point of view.
All subjects were office workers, either researchers from various fields or ad-
ministrative staff in an academic environment. They generally had extensive ex-
perience with typical desktop applications and Internet usage, some also from a
more technical point of view.
6.1 Study 1: Comparison to WLAN with captive portal and
password authentication
Experimental design Our first study directly compared the end-user expe-
rience and satisfaction between a currently deployed solution and our IPSecME
research prototype. Subjects were asked to get access to the respective WLAN
with a standard laptop running Windows XP. In our study, neither of the vari-
ants assumed any a priori information to be shared between the subjects, who
acted as guests in a new environment, and the WLAN environment itself. For
simplifying the study, two laptops were used, one set to the WLAN ESSID of
the first, the other to the ESSID of the second network. When opening the web
browser (Mozilla Firefox) in the respective unauthenticated states, both displayed
a captive web page with instructions on how to gain access to the network.
The aim of this study was to compare usability and end-user experience, and
therefore subjects were not explicitly educated about the underlying principles and
differences between the methods. Specifically, they were not told that the existing
method only authorizes their laptop to access the network, while our IPSecME
method additionally provides a secure IPSec channel for all IP connections.
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Figure 5a shows the WLAN captive portal web page used at Lancaster Univer-
sity. Users can enter their normal network account details in the form of username
and password to gain access to the network. Guests new to this environment would
not have such an account, and therefore our subjects were asked to use one specific
account and given the username and password (12 randomized characters, mixed
upper and lower case letters and digits).
Figure 5b shows the captive portal web page as displayed to unauthenticated
guests by our IPSecME WLAN gateway. This page simply allows to download the
Java Webstart client application as shown earlier in Fig. 4. The Relate dongles
were already plugged into the laptop, and subjects were told to follow the instruc-
tions on the web page. These instructions proved to be sufficient for subjects to
use IPSecME for gaining network access.
For finishing the defined task of accessing the Google web page using both
methods, the subjects required around 5 minutes on average. Measured variables
were the number of errors, required time to read the captive web page, and time
from starting the respective first step of authentication until successfully finishing
it. For both methods, the investigator then closed the browsers and asked the
subjects to perform the same task a second time, simulating subsequent network
access, e.g. the next day of a visit. Variables were only recorded for the first access,
the second aimed at examining user satisfaction. Finally, subjects were asked the
following questions for both methods:
• I found the method easy to use for one-time access.
• I found the method fast to use for one-time access.
• I found the method easy to use for subsequent access.
• I found the method fast to use for subsequent access.
Answers to the above questions were a seven-point Likert scale with ratings from
1 (“strongly agree”) to 7 (“strongly disagree”). Additionally, users were asked
which method they liked more and which method they felt was more secure. On
the next page, i.e. only after answering these questions, subjects were asked if:
• Were you aware that the IPSecME method provides encrypted connections?
(Yes/No)
• Are you concerned about someone recording your Wireless Network usage
(web sites, email)? (Yes/No)
Results Due to the complexity of the whole process of gaining network access
and the large underlying differences between the methods, study 1 was split into
two phases.
A preliminary study with 15 subjects, 26.7% female, 73.3% male, was used to
exploratively discover issues in user interaction and understanding, and to refine
the exact study procedure and questionnaire so as to reduce any study bias towards
either of the methods as far as possible. As a result, we were able to improve the
user interface for making the underlying steps of IPSecME clearer. Especially the
involvement and usage of the certificate is now visualized in multiple places, as
this turned out to be an unknown concept to many users.
The main study was conducted with 30 different subjects (non-overlapping
with the preliminary study), 40% female, 60% male. 80% had used the existing
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(a) Password-based method: au-
thentication
(b) IPSecME method: reading
captive web page
(c) IPSecME method: authenti-
cation
Figure 6: Results: required times for gaining network access
Question Access Median existing Median IPSecME z p <
“easy to use” one-time 2 3 -1.21 0.226
“fast to use” one-time 2 2.5 -0.81 0.42
“easy to use” subsequent 2 1 -3.85 0.0001
“fast to use” subsequent 3 1 -3.98 0.0001
Table 1: Results: rated answers to questionnaire and Wilcoxon Signed Rank test results
Lancaster WLAN before. For the existing Lancaster password-based method,
2 subjects made 1 error during entering the password and 3 subjects made 3
errors. For the IPSecME method, there were no user errors at all, but for 12
subjects the Relate authentication protocol failed due to distance measurement
errors on the ultrasound channel and had to be repeated (we refer to [13] for a
more detailed description of false negatives in the protocol). In this case, users (on
the client) needed to acknowledge a dialog box stating that the protocol failed and
the investigator (on the authentication proxy) restarted the device authentication.
Figure 6 shows the times people took for reading the IPSecME captive web
page (with a mean of µ = 14.76 seconds and a standard deviation of σ = 14.58
seconds) and to complete the respective authentication methods (µ = 40.95 and
σ = 44.39 for the existing, µ = 36.63 and σ = 13.27 for the IPSecME method).
For the existing password-based method, reading times were negligable due to
the high familarity of most subjects. In the direct comparison, 15 subjects pre-
ferred IPSecME, 4 preferred the existing method, and the remaining 11 had no
clear preference, but acknowledged advantages and disadvantages of both meth-
ods. Although common tests for significance can not be applied in this case, it is
interesting to note that all 5 subjects who made errors during typing in the pass-
word for the existing method preferred IPSecME. 15 subjects felt that IPSecME
was more secure (10 of which also stated that they preferred IPSecME), 9 felt
that the existing method was more secure, and 6 could not decide. Without ex-
plicitly pointing it out, 14 subjects were aware of the fact that IPSecME provided
encrypted connections after authentication, and 16 were not. 24 were generally
concerned about anybody recording their wireless network usage when using in-
secure access methods.
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For first time access, a Wilcoxon Signed Rank test does not show statistically
significant differences for either of the questions (see Table 1: a rating of 1 means
“strongly agree”, 2 means “agree”, and 3 means “slightly agree”). However, there
are statistically significant differences for subsequent accesses, indicating that our
subjects rated IPSecME higher than the existing password-based method for sub-
sequent accesses both in terms of ease of use and of speed.
Discussion The general impression of study 1 is that, even though IPSecME is
a new and unknown method and sometimes produces authentication errors that
require a retry, our subjects were comfortable using it for the first time and rated
it similarly to the existing method. For subsequent access, IPSecME is rated
significantly better, which is unsurprising due to the automatic reconnects within
the lifetime of the certificate, compared to the need for re-authentication on each
access using the existing method.
When accumulating reading and authentication times, IPSecME takes on av-
erage about 10 seconds longer, but it can be argued that reading the web page
is a one-time task, while the authentication process itself is quicker. Our sub-
jects seem to implicitly have taken this into account, as IPSecME was rated only
slightly lower in terms of one-time authentication speed.
From additional, informal answers given by the subjects, we found that this
convenience provided by installing a certificate on the client machine is seen as a
major advantage. In the preliminary study, a few users expressed concerns about
running additional software (the IPSecME client application) on their machines,
while this did not appear as an issue in the main study. This is presumably due
to improvements in the user interface to more clearly indicate what the client
application does and how the certificate is being used.
6.2 Study 2: Selecting real-world devices with a spatial GUI
Experimental design The second study examines our method from the au-
thentication proxy point of view and investigates how well people deal with our
spatial selection method and user interface. 30 subjects were seated at a specific
place in front of a meeting table and asked to use a laptop with 15” display, mouse,
and attached Relate dongle for selecting different devices using our spatial user
interface.
Figure 7 shows the two investigated settings with slightly different placement
of the other 5 devices that were equipped with Relate dongles. Every device had
its number printed on the case and clearly visible to the subject. To alleviate the
influence of a training bias, an initial task used setting 1 for training purposes.
With only devices 2 and 4 present, the procedure for the following tasks was
explained: after the investigator mentioned a device number, the subject should
select the corresponding device icon in the spatial user interface by right-clicking
on it and then clicking on the pop-up menu item. Actions and errors were not
recorded for the training task of selecting device number 4. Figure 8 shows the
simplified placement of devices 2 and 4 and the spatial user interface as it was








































(a) Setting 1: equidistant spacing (b) Setting 2: clusters
Figure 7: Placement of devices on the table and in the spatial user interface
Participant
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(a) Simplified setting 1 for training (b) Spatial user interface during training task
Figure 8: Training task
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To focus on the spatial selection, our user interface uses the same icon for
all devices and does not show any identification information; the only textual
information shown is the respective measured distance to the device. Therefore,
different positions are the only distinguishing criteria. Informally, we discovered
that subjects did not use the printed distances as an aid, but mostly the placement
of the other devices relative to each other.
The task was for subjects to select 4 different devices, 2 in each setting. First
they were asked to select device 2 followed by device 5 in setting 1, then device 1
followed by device 3 in setting 2. While changing the setup from setting 1 to
setting 2 by slightly moving the devices, subjects were able to watch the laptop
screen and follow the movement in the spatial user interface. Figure 7 also shows
the respective spatial user interfaces.
An additional task was used to investigate correlations between the ability to
estimate distances to and between real-world objects and perceived difficulties
in mapping spatial relationships with our user interface. Subjects were asked to
estimate the distances:
• between themselves and the door (2.60 m)
• the width of the door (1 m)
• between devices 2 and 3 (1.45 m)
• the width of the table (2.8 m)
The absolute distances between the estimates given by the subjects and the real
distances were accumulated for each subject. In addition, the investigator asked
how easy the subjects found the mapping task (rating 1 to 7). The whole study
took around 7 minutes per subject on average. Measured variables were the time
from when the investigator named the real-world device until the subject right-
clicked on the correct item in the spatial user interface and the number of errors
until the correct device was selected.
Results 30 subjects, 23.3% female, 76.7% male, participated in the second study.
25 of these subjects are researchers in computer science, 1 is a researcher from a
different area, and 4 belong to the University administrative staff.
Figure 9 shows the measured times the subjects needed to select the correct
devices. Mean times for task 1 were µ = 3.2 with σ = 1.91, for task 2 µ = 3.39
with σ = 3.34, for task 3 µ = 2.89 with σ = 1.77, and for task 4 µ = 2.58 with
σ = 1.19 seconds. The numbers of subjects making errors were, for each of the
tasks, 2 (with 1 error per subject), 1 (the subject made 2 errors at this task), 1
(only 1 error), and 0, respectively, and the errors are fully disjoint, i.e. made by 4
different subjects. All 4 subjects who made errors answered that the tasks were
easy to perform.
We performed three tests to examine statistical correlations:
• The hypothesis of a correlation between the subjects making any error during
the mapping tasks and their answer to the question on ease of use was neither
accepted not rejected with statistical significance. This is an expected results

































Figure 9: Results: required times for device selection
• The hypothesis of a correlation between the accumulated absolute error of
distance estimates and the the subjects making any error during the mapping
tasks was also neither accepted not rejected with statistical significance.
• For the third test, the accumulated absolute errors were classified into two
groups: [0; 1] m and ]1; inf[ m. A Mann-Whitney test shows a correlation
with the answer to the question on ease of use with U = 49.5 and p < 0.08.
Therefore, people who were better at estimating real-world distances found
the task easier to perform, which matches intuition.
Discussion Due to the small error rate, we can not quantitatively characterize
the errors. One likely influence seems to be a training effect, because two subjects
made an error during task 1, one subject each in tasks 2 and 3, but there were no
errors during task 4. There were two surprising findings: First, that task 2 took on
average longer than task 1, which is contrary to any learning effect. One possible
explanation is that the target device in task 2 was to the left of the subjects and
most probably outside their primary field of sight when facing straight; they had
to turn slightly to find it. Additionally, the device was smaller (a PDA instead of
a laptop). Second, that setting 2 seemed to be generally easier for subjects than
setting 1, although it contained partial occlusions of devices from the subject point
of view. The most probable explanation is that people can more easily deal with
clusters of small numbers than with a homogeneous group of a large number of
devices. In setting 2, there are two clusters, 3 devices to the left and 2 to the
right, and the numbers of devices are small enough so that people did not need to
count for selecting the target device.
The single outlier with a large time in task 2 was caused by the subject who
made 2 errors in the same task.
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6.3 Study 3: Comparison from an administrative point of
view
Another important aspect of wireless network access is its administration and
management. Our third study examines IPSecME from an administrator’s point
of view. With informal demo and interview sessions, we explained our approach
to the two network administrators responsible for the Computing Department at
Lancaster University.
In an interactive questionnaire, both administrators stated that the currently
deployed system was problematic for spontaneous guest access; although the cre-
ation of guest accounts, e.g. for meetings hosted at the department, was supported,
it was a cumbersome and slow process that was unsuitable for spontaneous access.
Standard practice is therefore for the hosts to either share their password or enter
it at the guest’s mobile device to grant access, both of which is questionable in
terms of network security. An additional issue is that MacOS/X and Linux users
are not well supported by the policy of periodic password changes. When not
logging on to the Windows domain but only to the wireless network, passwords
can not be changed and thus expire, forcing users to find a Windows client to
re-gain wireless network access.
Although no clear preference for permanent, registered users has been men-
tioned, the administrators would prefer IPSecME over the current system for
managing guest access. The major two reasons for this preference are security
and spontaneous access. Security is improved by creating client-specific X.509
certificates on the fly for network access, and guests no longer need to use access
credentials of registered users, which significantly improves accountability. Spon-
taneous access for clients is made easier by allowing local administrators, hosts of
meetings and events, or secretarial staff to quickly grant network access while re-
stricting it to specific guest devices, instead of having to interact with centralized
authorization databases.
7 Discussion
The concept of an authentication proxy is generally applicable to arbitrary ways
of authentication via shared context, and NiaB has already shown that the use
of a special instance of an authentication proxy with infrared works well. It has
yet to be investigated how well this concept integrates with other options such as
cameras or microphones for sensing shared context. Our software [10] has been
designed to make the context authentication protocol exchangeable. It is a simple
task to change our application to use IrDA like in NiaB, for example, or to use
something different like authentication over an audio channel [4] or with mobile
phone cameras [15]. Even though practical applications have not yet made use of
authentication proxies in those cases, we do not anticipate any major obstacles.
There are also other options for implementing the secure channel after suc-
cessful authentication. In this work, we use the well-known IPSec protocol, but
the different TLS suites, IEEE 802.1x, or IEEE 802.11i are also considered to be
secure protocols and may be more appropriate for different application scenarios.
Securing WLANs has been chosen as a scenario due to its practicality and wide
applicability. By leaving the WLAN itself open and publicly accessible, we can
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provide public services usable without authentication, and additional access to
authenticated users. We already use this possibility to deliver the authentication
application to new clients, thus making it unnecessary to require any pre-installed
software. This combination of two (or multiple) levels of service is more difficult
to achieve with IEEE 802.1x. For purely spontaneous interaction, IPSec transport
connections can be used between just two hosts instead of tunnel connections for
securing all traffic a host generates.
For trust delegation, there are again multiple possibilities. In our application,
we rely on standard PKI techniques, but shared passwords, OpenPGP keys, or
even hardware tokens are other examples that can be used with the same concept.
The decision of using online or offline relationships between the service and the
authentication proxy is also highly dependent on both the application and the trust
model. If the trust model allows delegation of trust, then an active authentication
proxy can have distinct advantages, especially when a wireless connection to the
actual service is not available ubiquitously. The trust relationship then allows pre-
authentication of a client to the service, via the authentication proxy, even before
any wireless contact to the actual service is possible. This gives more freedom in
performing the authentication, because it can be done at any time for later use.
Our application demonstrates this by pre-authenticating IPSec connections for
accessing a private network securely over an otherwise public WLAN or from the
Internet. This use of IPSec connections is often termed “road warrior” support,
because the home network can be accessed from anywhere.
The security of our approach builds upon three parts: First, our context au-
thentication protocol is considered secure against known attack scenarios; it uses
multiple rounds of an interlock protocol to verify that only a device at a specific
relative position can successfully authenticate. Ultrasound sensing is used as a side
channel for transmitting information, in a way that is tightly interwoven with the
spatial relationship between devices and that prevents man-in-the-middle attacks
on the wireless channel (see [13] and [12] for a more detailed analysis). Second,
IPSec as a protocol for secure channels is currently considered as one of the most
secure standards. Third, well-known PKI techniques delegate trust to the context
authentication proxy. We explicitly point out that the security of our proposed
use of authentication proxies relies on the physical security of the proxy devices;
when attackers can access these proxies physically, they can access resources as
defined by the respective trust model. This is not a new restriction — the security
of most protocols relies on physical security of some of its components. An active
authentication proxy, like the PDA in our example application, might be small
and mobile, and thus even more care needs to be taken to protect it.
When comparing our method with others from a user point of view, we need
to distinguish two different aspects. One is the ease of use for gaining access to
a protected WLAN. Our user study presented in Section 6.1 shows that spatial
authentication compares favourably even to a method already known to and used
by the subjects, mostly because of forming a longer-lived security association that
can be re-used for subsequent network access.
The second aspect is to establish secure IPSec connections, which is not sup-
ported by the standard password-based approach, and thus not currently used by
most subjects. Due to this lack of real-world comparability, we only have anecdo-
tal evidence that IPSec connection set-up is significantly eased by our use of an
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active authentication proxy: For comparable security using e.g. the web adminis-
tration interface of Gibraltar firewall, an administrator first needs to log in and
navigate to the certificate management module (4 steps), create a new certificate
for the client (10 fields in a web form), and download it. Then this certificate
needs to be imported on the client machine (manual transfer of the file, e.g. with
a USB storage device, followed by 14 steps under Windows XP) and an IPSec con-
nection needs to be created (8 steps with the Windows XP wizard). In contrast,
using our demonstration application, a new client needs to start the application (1
step, Fig. 4a), an administrator needs to spatially select the client device (1 step,
Fig. 4b) and enter the certificate details (2 fields, Fig. 4c). After automatically
transmitting the new certificate to the client and importing it, the user only needs
to start the IPSec connection (1 step, Fig. 4e). Intuitively it seems clear that it
is a considerable improvement over manual configuration. By explicitly assigning
the authentication proxy an active role, the end user is relieved from dealing with
the connection set-up details at all. This combines into a single step two tasks
that are usually separate: the selection, often called identification, of a device
followed by a proper authentication, and the authorization to use some service.
We argue that only one step, namely deciding about authorization, is necessary
from an administrator point of view and that the authentication step should be
made implicit for spontaneous interaction to become viable.
It might become difficult to distinguish devices on the visualized map when too
many are presented at once. However, in our user study this did not appear as a
problem, and the issue would be implementation specific and is not inherent to the
concept of an authentication proxy. We point out that the use of spatial reference
for context authentication assumes the availability of appropriate sensors, either
built into a device, or attached to it. For example in a meeting scenario, spatial
reference is a generally useful tool [9] and using it for granting temporary access to
resources – with the approach described in this article – thus integrates seamlessly.
In other scenarios, ultrasound sensing might not be readily available for current
mobile devices. Although our USB dongles make it easy to attach them, it is an
additional step that needs to be done. But, as mobile devices begin to include more
sensors, context authentication will be more easily possible in the near future.
8 Conclusions
In this article, we argue that context authentication is more intuitive then typi-
cal password- or certificate-based methods, especially for spontaneous interaction.
The example of setting up secure WLAN connections shows clearly that these
often-used methods do not scale with regards to the number of wireless connec-
tions used by a single person. A direct comparison between the number of steps
that need to be executed by a user and an administrator for creating such a secure
connection between a password-, a certificate-, and a context-based authentication
procedure is obviously biased; our demonstration application has been designed
specifically to make this as easy as possible, while other methods are usually not
aimed at supporting spontaneous interaction. Nonetheless, practical experience
shows that those WLANs where simple, spontaneous interaction is desired, such
as WLAN hot spots in hotels or airports, either do not use any authentication at
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all or tend to be seen as awkward by most users. Context authentication allows
to provide secure wireless connections without demanding user attention “just for
security”. Our main contribution is the general concept of a context authentica-
tion proxy, which allows devices to use context authentication when they can not
actually experience the same sensor values for any suitable aspect of context. A
first demonstration application implements this concept for a prominent example,
namely WLAN access. The fact that other projects have also approached this
scenario shows the practical importance of the problem.
Compared to SWG, we benefit from the use of certificates to provide better se-
curity for larger scenarios, where re-keying of the whole system to disable access for
a single client is not reasonable. We extend the results of the NiaB project in three
areas: First, by making the context authentication proxy active, we give both the
clients and the administrator more flexibility in the authentication process. By
running a CA on the proxy, the decisions about authentication and authorization
can be condensed into only one spatial device selection step to improve ease of
use. Second, the proxy is made mobile and supports offline authentication where
connectivity to the target network is not available. Third, ultrasound sensing pro-
vides more fine-grained selection of devices, and the same granularity is used in
the spatial authentication protocol. This allows multiple devices in the same area
to be distinguished better, e.g. to grant temporary network access in a meeting
scenario with multiple laptops and PDAs on one desk. With an infrared channel
like the one used in NiaB, there is no protection against active man-in-the-middle
attacks. Therefore, the context authentication needs to be run in a secure envi-
ronment where such attacks are prevented by organizational restrictions (e.g. that
only one device is allowed to enter the authentication room at any time). With our
proposed spatial authentication protocol, context authentication is secure even in
public and untrusted environments.
Complete source code of our client and proxy implementations is available at
http://www.openuat.org/spatial-ipsec-proxy, including configuration files
for the gateway using Gibraltar firewall and using OpenWrt.
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